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The	UK	labour	market	and	COVID-19:	how	to	measure
excess,	where	to	look	for	it,	and	what	it	shows
Think	the	outlook	for	the	UK	labour	market	in	the	wake	of	the	coronavirus	pandemic	looks	bad?	But
just	how	bad?	And	along	which	dimensions?	Jonathan	Wadsworth	answers	these	questions.	He
concludes	that	the	crisis	was	marked	by	higher	absences	from	work	as	well	as	a	large	rise	in	short-
time	working	and	hiring	freezes,	not	by	wage	cuts	and	mass	layoffs.	
In	a	rapidly	evolving	crisis,	there	is	a	need	for	timely	information	to	assess	labour	market
performance	and	develop	strategies	to	address	the	problems	that	emerge.	Statisticians	are	currently
using	graphical	techniques	to	illustrate	the	grim	path	of	‘excess	deaths’	over	the	COVID-19	crisis	–	deaths	over	and
above	the	norm	in	any	given	week.	These	are	useful,	if	extremely	morbid,	ways	of	conveying	and	updating
information	at	regular	intervals.	So	it	can	be	helpful	to	harness	these	techniques	to	analyse	labour	market
performance.
Administrative	data,	like	the	claimant	count	measure	of	unemployment,	are	timely	but	not	generally	rich	enough	to
provide	the	comprehensive	view	of	labour	market	performance	needed	to	inform	and	develop	policy.	Household
surveys,	like	the	Labour	Force	Survey	(LFS)	–	used	to	estimate	the	official	UK	unemployment	rate	–	are	much
richer	but	have	been	used/made	available	at	more	discrete	intervals,	making	assessments	of	labour	market
performance	better,	but	less	contemporary.
The	LFS	is,	however,	conducted	every	week	of	the	year.	So	we	can	use	this	weekly	information	to	estimate	a	broad
range	of	labour	market	indicators	at	much	higher	frequencies	than	usual.	We	can	compare	the	current	weekly
performance	of,	say,	the	unemployment	rate	with	the	equivalent	weekly	norm	observed	over	the	previous	five
years.	Any	sustained	departures	from	the	norm	is	something	to	take	heed	of.
What	indicators	should	we	look	out	for?	Faced	with	a	shock,	firms	may	adjust	their	labour	costs	through	changes	in
wages,	hours	or	personnel.	Workers	have	some	influence	on	this	through	unions	and	their	intrinsic	worth	to	an
employer.	This	means	that	mass	layoffs	should	usually	be	a	last	resort,	and	hiring,	hours,	or	wages	may	be	a	first
response.	Self-employment	and	temporary	working	are	also	more	cyclical	types	of	working	and	so	could	be	among
the	first	to	decline	in	a	downturn.	Which	of	these	features	stands	out	in	any	recession	typically	varies	across
countries,	recessions,	and	often	during	the	course	of	a	recession.
So	we	need	to	track	as	comprehensive	a	set	of	indicators	as	frequently	as	possible	and	look	for	any	departures
from	the	norm	(‘excess’).
The	graphs	that	follow	plot	the	five-year	average	(dotted	line)	for	an	indicator	in	each	week	of	the	year	–	the	‘norm’
–		alongside	its	five-yearly	maximum	and	minimum	values	for	the	same	week	(grey	shade).	The	equivalent	2020
weekly	estimates	(solid	line)	are	then	overlaid.	The	‘excess’	on	the	graphs	is	the	difference	between	the	solid	and
dotted	lines.	Any	2020	data	outside	the	grey	range	is	a	notable	departure	from	the	norm.	Adding	these	weekly
excesses	gives	the	‘cumulative	excess’	of,	say,	unemployment,	(for	details	see	here).
The	dashed	vertical	lines	on	the	graphs	highlight	the	first	registered	COVID-19-related	death	(week	5	of	the
calendar	year)	and	the	week	the	UK	went	into	lockdown	(week	12).	The	2020	data	currently	run	to	week	22,	the	last
week	of	May.
Unemployment
Using	the	most	common	metric	of	labour	market	performance,	not	much	can	be	observed	over	the	first	twenty-two
weeks	of	2020	that	was	unusual.	Figure	1	shows	that	UK	unemployment	is	typically	lower	in	the	weeks	that	run	up
to	Christmas	and	higher	immediately	after.	However,	the	weekly	unemployment	rate	in	the	first	eighteen	weeks	of
the	coronavirus	crisis	was	well	below	the	average	of	the	last	five	years.	A	similar	story	applies	to	the	employment
rate	and	self-employed	and	temporary	jobs.	No	obvious	departures	from	previous	norms.
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However,	things	start	to	look	less	than	normal	when	we	look	at	other	margins	of	labour	market	adjustment.	Figure	2
shows	the	percentage	of	workers	who	say	they	had	a	job	but	were	away	and	did	zero	hours	during	the	survey
week.	The	weekly	norms	show	large	spikes	around	Christmas,	Easter,	and	the	summer	holiday	season.	However,
there	is	a	notable	departure	from	the	norm	that	begins	in	week	10	of	2020	and	increases	rapidly	to	24%	of	the
employed	by	week	16	(four	weeks	into	lockdown).	This	is	around	5.4	million	more	workers	away	from	their	jobs	than
expected	at	that	week	in	the	year.	By	week	22,	the	start	of	the	government’s	gradual	relaxation	of	lockdown,
absences	from	work	had	fallen	back	to	just	under	20%	of	the	employed	workforce.	Adding	up	these	excesses	from
week	5	to	week	22	suggests	that	there	were	around	53	million	additional	person-week	absences	from	work.	This	is
equivalent	to	the	entire	UK	workforce	doing	nothing	for	one	week	and	three	days.
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The	shock	to	output	is	larger	than	this	because	among	the	majority	of	employed	still	in	work	and	not	away,	many
were	working	fewer	hours	than	usual.	Some	48%	reported	working	fewer	hours	than	usual	in	lockdown	week	12.
The	number	of	hours	worked	by	the	average	(median)	worker	fell	from	the	norm	of	38	to	23	during	week	13	(Figure
3),	before	gradually	rising	back	to	around	32	hours	a	week	by	week	22,	still	much	less	than	the	norm	for	this	week.
Average	hours	worked	usually	drop	at	Christmas,	Easter,	and	the	summer	holiday	weeks,	but	the	departures	from
the	norm	in	week	13	and	afterwards	are	notable.
With	31.5	million	people	in	work,	multiplying	by	the	number	of	hours	each	person	works	gives	a	weekly	norm	of
around	1000	million	person	hours.	If	we	add	all	the	lost	hours	for	every	individual,	the	cumulative	excess	suggests	a
fall	of	1700	million	hours	since	the	crisis	began,	equivalent	to	the	entire	workforce	doing	nothing	for	one	week	and
two	days.
British Politics and Policy at LSE: The UK labour market and COVID-19: how to measure excess, where to look for it, and what it shows Page 3 of 5
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-07-28
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/labour-market-covid19/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/
Hiring	in	the	UK	also	fell	noticeably	over	the	crisis.	Figure	4	plots	the	proportion	of	employees	who	have	been	in
new	jobs	for	under	one	month.	Between	2%	to	4%	of	the	workforce	is	usually	newly-hired	in	any	week,	with	fewer
hires	in	spring	and	autumn	being	the	main	hiring	period.	However,	hiring	rates	in	the	spring	of	2020	were	some	one
to	two	percentage	points	below	seasonal	norms	in	the	weeks	leading	up	to	the	lockdown	and	thereafter.	In	short,
hiring	stalled	over	the	crisis.	Cumulative	hires	were	some	21.5	percentage	points	lower	than	usual	by	the	end	of
week	22.	This	is	around	6.8	million	fewer	hires	than	might	be	expected.
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With	hiring	stalled,	it	could	be	that	employers	have	adjusted	their	workforce	costs	without	the	need	for	further
adjustments.	This	indeed	appears	to	be	the	case	so	far.	There	is	no	obvious	departure	from	weekly	norms	in	the
incidence	of	layoffs.	Nor	does	it	seem	that	wages	have	yet	taken	a	hit.
So	where	are	we?
It	seems	that	the	typical	metrics	of	labour	market	performance	have	not	been	noticeably	affected	during	the	first
three	months	of	the	coronavirus	crisis	in	the	UK.	Instead,	the	crisis	was	marked	by	higher	absences	from	work,	a
large	rise	in	short-time	working	and	hiring	freezes	rather	than	wage	cuts	and	mass	layoffs.	Things	may	change,	but
we	now	know	where	and	how	to	look.
	
All	articles	posted	on	this	blog	give	the	views	of	the	author(s),	and	not	the	position	of	LSE	British	Politics	and	Policy,
nor	of	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science.
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